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1 1

Charles White

The Economic Community of West African StatQs (ECOWJ\S)
was established by treaty in 1975 to promote the economic
and political well-being of its 16 regional members. As a
coordinated effort of geographically associated states ECOWAS
joins an expanding group of regional integration schemes
created by developing countries.

2

As an international organization with some claim to
supranational authority the success of the ECOWAS scheme
is of practical and theoretical importance. Success in this
sense implies an increasing level of interaction among the
ECOWAS members and the development of a regional economic
and political position toward non-member states. This coordination of member states' nu.tional policy within

il

re9ion-

ally constituted political body offers an interesting laboratory for the examination of regional integration efforts.
This paper seeks to establish the degree of integration
achieved by the ECOWAS members to date and to chart the
progress of that integration over time.
ECOWAS is placed in the historic

and theoretic con-

text of regional integration efforts; particular attention
is paid to the European Economic Conununity (EEC). The
theoretical review is notably

concerned with demonstrating

the rationale for integration efforts between developing
countries and distinguishing this position from the rationale
which motivated the founders of the EEC.
~

To establish the degree of integration among the ECOWAS
members data sets were devised and assembled. The data considered were chosen from data

tested and validated in the

political science literature as displaying high levels of
reliability and value for measuring

~ntegration.

Ultimately data sets were collected charting the member
states' treaty activity, United Nations General Assembly

3

roll call votes, and international trade patterns.
The treaty and voting analyses followed traditionally
accepted methodologies and offered rather unsatisfying
results. The trade data analysis, on the other hand, incorporated new theoretical and

practi~al

research techniques

which demonstrated a refined consideration of integration
within ECOWAS. 'l'he trade data analysis has universal application, and can be used to establish integration progress
as it occures among developing countries.
The paper concludes that the ECOWAS member states,
while lacking many of the prerequisites for successful integration, at least to the degree demonstrated by the EEC
members, still have the potential for limited success from
their integration efforts.
Trade data analyses indicate that a high level of nonprimary product trade is actually directed within the community. What is required for increased integration efforts
in the future is not so much a redirection of trade into the
corcununity but rather an increase in the level of trade already established among the members. This increase in trade
can only be expected as the member states' economies develop.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In Africa, as in other regions of the world, national
leaders have struggled to increase tbe degree of political
and economic strength of their respective countries.
Somewhat ironically, many national leaders have chosen a
path to potential strength that centers attention on close
economic and political cooperation among fellow, regionally
delimited, states.

This cooperation can take the form of an

integration of economic and political policies and decisionmaking bodies among the regional states.
Just such a movement toward regional policy making has
been established in West Africa, in the form of the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which is pledged
to
promote cooperation and development in all fields of
economic activity . . . in social and cultural matters
. and increasing and maintaining economic stability
and fostering closer relations among its members. 1
Established by treaty in 1975, ECOWAS is made up of
sixteen contiguous states in West Africa (see map - Appendix
A) .

Members of ECOWAS are poor countries with weak economies

and nascent traditions of national government.

Physically

the states range in size from Niger (489,191 square miles),
to tiny Gambia, a riparian state which is little more than

2

4, 361 square miles of the Gambia River valley and is surrounded
on three sides by Senegal.

Political and economic diversity

in the region is just as great.
Membership in ECOWAS is opened to all West African
states.

While the term West Africa lacks geographic precision,

the present affiliates appear to have filled the roster of
potential members.

Cameroon to the southeast is already a

member of the Central African Customs and Economic Union,
and Chad to the east has been associated with the North
African states.

One could speculate that Western Sahara, if

declared a state, may desire membership in an effort to
distance itself from Morocco, a regional adversary, but this
eventuality remains to be seen.

Western Sahara leaders have

also had differences in the past with ECOWAS members,
particularly Mauritania.
As an international organization pledged to the
establishment and

maintenance of economic integration,

ECOWAS joins an historic movement that began in the early
1950s with the evolution of the European Economic Community
(EEC).

Most of the early integration studies focused on the

EEC and integration models were designed for European
realities.
Integration between sovereign states i~ a variable
concept with political, economic, and social elements.
Social scientists have been interested in measuring this
variability and have adopted a multitude of indicators which

3

analysts believe can represent degrees of integration among
states.

Political scientists are particularly hampered in

their efforts to measure integration.

Beyond the examination

of formal political structures, political scientists have
often chosen to follow economic and social indicators and
impute from trends discovered in those data levels of political
integration.
This study will review the concept of integration and
will attempt to demonstrate the level of integration within
ECOWAS.

It will introduce measurement techniques that will

have special applicability to studies of integration among
third world states.

Social statistics are often lacking in

third world states and the specialized indicators of ten
employed in the past to examine integration in Europe are
simply not available for studies of non-European integration
efforts.
This study will examine the validity of the political
actions of treaty making activity and the voting patterns of
the member states at the General Assembly of the United
Nations as indicators of integration.

These measures hold

intuitive validity for integration studies and have historical
precedence as useful indicators for measuring integration
within the EEC.

Data on import and export patterns to member

and non-member countries have also been used to implicitly
measure political integration.

In this study the theoretical

rationale for the employment of trade data is reviewed and a

4
new approach to the use of trade data is presented.

This

refined approach offers a more enlightened view of trade
relations between third world countries who typically have
high concentrations of primary product exports.
The ECOWAS scheme is the product of historical
circumstances.

The historical context will be examined and

the major events leading up to the signature of the ECOWAS
treaty in May 1975 will be reviewed.

Political events after

1975 will also be considered.
In spite of all optimism, there are strong structural
limitations to the potential success of ECOWAS.

These

obstacles, to ECOWAS and to other third world integration
schemes, are presented in this study.
Through an examination of the integration data and the
history of the ECOWAS integration scheme conclusions will be
drawn about the level of integration that ECOWAS enjoys today
and speculation about the future will be offered.
The objectives of this study are ultimately 1) to
examine the integration movement of the ECOWAS states and
present a profile of that movement over time; and 2) consider
the validity of integration indicators in a third world
context and present refined indicators and a new measurement
technique which, it is hoped, will have universal applicability
for the study of integration effort schemes.

FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER I
1

Treaty of the Economic Community of West African
States, Article 2, para. 1, International Legal Materials
14 (1975): 1201.

CHAPTER II
SURVEY OF INTEGRATION THEORY
As an integration scheme the ECOWAS plan falls into
the large and diverse body of theoretical literature devoted
to transnational integration.
A recent definition of integration suggests that, as
a process, integration is,
The means through which various states within a
region, in a peaceful and noncoercive manner,
collectively seek to resolve conflicts in either a
preemptive or reactive response. Moreover, it is
a vehicle through which member states maximize, or
attempt to maximize, their national interests on a
long-range basis through the creation of supranational institutions and the evolution of regional
policies. 1
Integration as a formal theory developed, with more
restricted goals, in the last years of World War II.

From

those roots the concept blossomed and spread to theories both
general and specific; related to global, regional and unique
i~tegration

patterns.

There are also cross-disciplinary

concepts of integration, covering political, economic, and
social aspects of the issue.
This chapter will provide an overview of the relevant
integration literature.

Later chapters will present the

ECOWAS position within the evolution of integration theory.
The concept of integration has been applied to many
types of international

cooperati~e

efforts.

An often cited
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breakdown of the general categories of integration types and
their features appears in.Bela Balassa's, The Theory of

Economic Integration. 2
TABLE I
INTEGRATION TYPES AND FUNCTION
No
HarmoniTar if f
Common
zation
or External Free Flow of Economic
Quotas Tariffs of Factors
Policies
Free
Trade
Area

x

Customs
Union

x

x

Common
Market

x

x

x

Economic
Union

x

x

x

x

Total
Economic
Integration X

x

x

x

Unification
of Policies,
Political
Institutions

x

While the focus of Balassa's categories is aimed at
economic factors, it can be seen that as the functions
assumed in the integration process increase, the greater
active participation the member states will play, therefore
demanding increased political activity within the integration
process.
These stages of economic integration are more than a
collection of static international agreements.

They involve

a created international organization designed to alter the
regional relations of the member states.

8

FUNCTIONALISM
While integration theory has developed into many
areas in the last forty years the historical bases are rooted
in the theoretical conception of David Mitrany.

Near the end

of World War II, he proposed a theory of functional integration.

3

The ultimate focus of his theory was to establish an "emeshment"
of the world's states in a number of relations that would
ease the possibility of future wars.

4

Mitrany posited that while international consensus for
political amalgamation in a universal or world federal state
did not exist, there were many issue areas where states can
and do interact which are of a nonpolitical nature.

5

According to Mitrany, these issue areas should be
organized into individual, issue-specific international
organizations which would seek to harmonize state policies
for the benefit of all members.

Unlike a universal, general

international organization the states need not be concerned
about encroachment of sovereignty; functional organizations
should neither expand nor dictate policy and are restricted
to their approved province of duties.

6

In a later work Mitrany sums up the functional perspective as a logic based on the view that,
A map of the world designed to show international
economic and social activities, would appear as an
intricate web of interests and relations, crossing
and recrossing political divisions . . . . The task
is to bring that map, which is already functioning
as a reality, under control of some form of international agencies.
Thus the political dividing
lines would in time be overlaid and blurred. 7

9

NEG-FUNCTIONALISM
Mitrany's early integration theory, initially global
and general in scope, received regional application in
Europe under the Schuman Plan.

In 1950, the French Foreign

Minister, Robert Schuman, proposed a unification of coal and
steel production between France and West Germany.

Other

European states were also invited to join.
The Schuman Plan introduced a new variant of the
functionalist thesis deemed neo-functionalism.

8

The neo-

functionalist expansion of the integration process sought to
establish common activities through a direct assault on
politically sensitive, yet bureaucratic managed industries. 9
While one of the key motivations of the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC) was the amalgamation of industrial
production, designed to make war "materially impossible,"
other motivations were also at work.

10

This move to key industries required the addition of a
full-time international bureaucracy with a substantial
expansion of duties beyond those envisioned by Mitrany.
It would be hoped that this industrial integration
would, through the process of "spillover," require increased
integration and policy coordination in other related areas.
Spillover is a concept that increased integration activities
in a given sector will create imbalances in other policy
areas, difficulties which, in turn, could best be solved by
an increased scope of integration activities.

In later

10
research, Nye identified a related feature, transaction
increases, which may call for similar adjustment.

11

This approach is a far cry from the original functionalist model, based on multiple, non-political single-issue
organizations.
Empirically, the process of movement from functionalist
theory to nee-functionalist success has been described as a
political process worked out in West Europe by Lindberg and
Scheingold in Europe's Would-Be Polity, Chapter 1.
INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
With the successful establishment of the ECSC, and
later the European Economic Community and Euratom, theoretical
considerations and empirical evaluations began to center on
West Europe as the model for integration efforts.

12

While the integration process had begun with a concern
for world peace, economic and welfare issues soon came to
the fore.

13

The process of integration however, remains a

political activity, as intrastate bargaining and policy
formation is initiated by state governments.

14

The early theories presupposed the existence of
elements of advanced industrial societies for the success of
integration efforts.

Advanced bureaucracies, developed

interest groups, and strong industrial imports and exports,
were all considered conducive, if not essential, to regional
integration success.

11

Within the scope of economic integration the benchmark
measure for potential integration hinged on the issue of
trade creation and trade diversion.

15

If, through the

integrative process of lowering tariffs among member states,
the purchase of domestically produced goods is replaced with
lower priced, regionally produced goods, then trade is
"created," efficiency is increased and tariffs come down.
On the other hand, if, through common regional tariffs,
purchases of cheaper extra-regional products are diverted to
more expensive regional products, then trade has been
diverted.
Integration efforts exhibiting trade diversion over
trade creation would be considered as contributing to regional
economic inefficiency and loss of welfare.

16

While integration considerations grew to hinge on
economic efficiency in the developed world, the less developed
regions adapted integration logic into a vehicle for their
own specific problems of underdevelopment.

17

By this new consideration, what will be created is an
amalgam of the development theory consideration of "import
substitution" and the integration concept of an expanded
market region.
In import substitution, economic efficiency of import
purchases is sacrificed by establishing tariff barriers
which encourage domestic production in fledgling industries.
While the initial consequence is loss of efficiency, this

12

process will aid in the expansion of a growing domestic
industrial base.
The expansion of the integration logic, from functionalist
world peace and welfare motives to issues of regional
development, are reflected in statements by the "fathers"
of functionalism and development integration.
Irt 1943, David Mitrany claimed that,
The real choice is between social performance
through national action and social performance
through international planning and action.is
In 1965, Bela Balassa restated this proposition for
the developing world,
The choice is not so much between import subs ti tut ion
and free trade in an integration area, as between
national. import substitution and regional. B
.Balassa states that while national markets may be too
small to ensure successful growth in economic development,
the region may be a physical unit more conducive to success.
He proposes that integration removes

"a~tificial"

national

boundaries within a region, which obstruct a unitary economic
region.

20

This economic view reflects Mitrany's earlier

conception of a global interaction map •
REGIONAL INTEGRATION: A NEW FORM OF GOVERNMENT?
As

neo~functionalists

expanded their theoretical

judgements in parallel with the developments of the European
Community, conjecture developed that the integration pro\

cess would lead to a supranational organization.

This

13
organization, it was hoped, would govern a "United States of
Europe."
Later case study analysis however, suggests that the
movement of states toward integration efforts was made, not
because of any dissatisfaction with the nation-state as a
sovereign unit, but rather because of agreement among
European leaders that the state was too small a unit for
effective policy success in some limited economic and social
issue areas.

21

What this process has in fact accomplished is to
bolster the strength of the nation-state as a sovereign unit
while it accepts a limited sacrifice of sovereignty in some
policy areas.

22

Two analysts sum up the process noting that integration
groupings are, instead of a "nation writ large" rather, "an
international system writ small."

23

Sovereignty has not been handed over to the regional
organizations, save for a few specific issue areas which
states recognize can best be organized to their benefit
through regional cooperation.
Theoretical considerations of integration suggested
that where nation-states would tend to agree to supranational
management was in the area of "low politics" issues.

In

developed states these policy areas could be considered as
those, usually of a welfare or economic efficiency scope,
where conceptions of national pride and political hegemony

14

did not prevail.

Some hoped this agreement on "lpw politics"

would lead to regional unification on "high politics" issues.
This has not been the case in the European Community.
Considering integration in developing regions it has
been noted that there is no level of low politics.

Devel-

opment issues and welfare are highly politicized, and
policies and decisions are often managed by national
politicians instead of the technocrats of nee-functionalist
logic.

24

Nonetheless,.many integration schemes have been

established in developing regions.
Integration policies in the economic sector can be
divided into elements_ of negative and positive integration. 25
In

~egative

integration, those elements of national

policy which inhibit the free flow of exchange; i.e. tariffs,
visa requirements, trade quotas, etc., are eliminated.

These

policy choices are regional agreements corresponding to the
lower ranges of the Balassa Scale, Free Trade Areas and
Customs Unions.

Without an established supranational

administrative body, some elements of integration can be
a6complished as nations seek to align policy in specific
issue areas.
#

26

Agreements of this sort will in turn create imbalances,

as trade relations shift to favor those states within the
new integration area who are most ready to benefit from
regional integration.

As barriers are removed the most

developed states will act to capitalize on the expanded

15
market.

Conversely, there will also develop pockets of

underdevelopment, they are the net losers in negative
integration.

27

In the European Community those regional pockets are
Southern Italy and Southwest France.

In the third world

they will be the least developed members of the integration
plan.
If these net losers are to remain members of the
integration effort there must be advancement of the
integration process to institutions of positive integration.
Positive integration elements participate in active redistribution policies designed to remedy regional imbalances
caused by the effects of negative integration.
These policies can be classified as either redistributive
or creative, providing funds for economic opportunities lost
or establishing development projects to balance the development
of the entire region.
For integration schemes in the less developed world,
Balassa suggests that the need for positive integration is
imperative.

He offers the following policy feature as

advisable for successful integration among the less developed
states,
1) Tariff reduction formula should be automatic
2) Government planning of development projects
3) Adjustment periods to Full Customs Union should
be extended for the least developed states in
region
4) Payment arrangements to facilitate convertibility
and save foreign exchange. 28

16
These features will be explored in later chapters as
they relate to the ECOWAS integration scheme.

Other problems,

typical of developing nation integration efforts and specific
to the ECOWAS region, will also be noted.
EMPIRICAL INTEGRATION MEASUREMENT
Integration is a relative concept.

Political scientists

have been interested in establishing the level or intensity
of. integration in a given region.

This division of integration

analysis is based on the assumption that interstate
integration can be quantified and measured by observing
the transaction profiles of the regional states.
There are many transaction indices that can be employed
to measure regional integration.

The most common are: levels

and directions of trade, student exchanges, tourist and elite
foreign travel, mail flows, and telephone communication.
While many of these indices have been suggested as reasonable
measures of integration, trade relationships have been the
most common indicator employed, as a measure of both economic
and political integration.

29

One clear reason for the reliance on trade relationships is
simply their availability.
or impossible to obtain.

30

Other indicators are expensive
A second, more important, reason

is the contention by some that trade interaction is the best
measurement of integration.

31

The debate remains whether transactions cause integration.

17
It has been argued that increased interaction, measured by
transaction data, could lead to an increased need for
integration machinery to manage or support the growing
relationships.

Uncertainty over the specific process through

which transactions may either cause integration, or be the
result of it, suggests that transactions may best serve as
indicators of integration.

32

This ignores the difficult

task of establishing the patterns of causation either way.
Transaction data serve best as an historical record of
regional integration.
analysis

though

33

They remain unreliable for predictive

general patterns do tend to remain similar

over short time spans.
While trade remains the most common transaction

indicate~

it has eeen stressed that a deep and broad sense of regional
integration requires multiple indices examined in over-time
studies.

34

Nye suggests that indicators of economic,

political, and social integration should be established.

35

While acknowledging the importance of social integration
for increasing levels of integration, it must be noted that
transaction data for this varient of integration--mail flows,
telephone connections, etc.-- are very difficult to collect. 36
Past studies using mail flow analysis found strong correlations
with trade data indices.

The correlations were strong enough

that Russett chose to eliminate mail flows as an area of
investigation because the difficulty of data collection was
not worth the potential, predictable outcome.

37

18
Other studies have employed personal interviewing
surveys, both of elites and the general public, but these
too are expensive and have exceptional validity problems.

38

While the data collection difficulties are noted
concerning West Europe, in the third world they are magnified
to the point where transaction analysis is rarely attempted.~
Published figures for gross national product, debt, export
earnings, etc., vary widely.~

Tables are speckled with

asterisks indicating that the data are an estimate, or for
a year other than the one specified, or simply not available.
Various sources even give differing figures for the land area
of some countries.
The United Nations Demographic Yearbook for 1981 outlined
some of the problems facing statisticians in Africa, noting
that it has been common practice for some data to be "taken
from a neighboring country where conditions are assumed to be
similar."

i+l

In 1977, the United Nations Economic Commission

for Africa (ECA) reported that there were only 1,500 official
statisticians working in all of Africa (compared to 23,000
employed in the United States), which is reflected in sparse
data of questionable accuracy.
The report of the tenth meeting of the Conference of
African Statisticians in 1977 said,
Quantity estimates of gross agricultural output
include a significant amount of guesswork owing to
the lack of available statistics, even for major
commodities. Food crop estimates are sometimes
based on eye estimates by field agents.
For some
countries, estimates of food crops are based on a

19
variety of sources such as data on population and
estimates of per capita consumption from fragmentary
and sporadic household surveys or information on
acreage and yields. 42
The report pointed out discrepancies in the methods and
accuracy of data collection used in various countries and
questioned the usefulness of combining data for the purpose
of comparison.
Statistical information published by the United Nations
and its agencies is usually taken from information provided
by national governments.

These figures in turn often form

the basis of calculations and statistics issued by the World
Bank and other multinational agencies.
Nevertheless, though the accuracy of the individual
statistics is questionable, the broad outline which the
available data

pro~ide

is sufficient to present an estimate

of the social and economic profile of the African states.
This study will attempt a transaction analysis of the
ECOWAS integration scheme.

The methods employed may be of

utility in measuring integration in any developing region.
I have employed data sets which are readily available
for all nations of the world and which offer a broad scope of
indicators which may come close to capsulizing the level of
integration thus far attained in West Africa.
The next two chapters will first establish the historical
context of ECOWAS in West African integration policy and
present an overview of the difficulties it may face.
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CHAPTER III
The drafting of the ECOWAS treaty was a multidimensional
political event.

Many factors contributed to its foundation,

others influence its potential for success.

This chapter

will serve to detail some of those factors and establish a
profile of the West African Community states.
COLONIAL HERITAGE AND HISTORICAL
FACTORS LEADING TO ECOWAS
The ECOWAS states share a common heritage of colonial
domination.

Only Liberia escaped colonization due to its

special relationship with the United States.

1

Eight of the ECOWAS states were once part of French
West Africa (FWA) .

Togo, once a German colony, was administered

by France as a Class B Mandate state for the League of Nations.
It was considered in many ways to be part of FWA yet remained
legally distinct.

FWA was governed through a central bureau-

cracy until independence movements began to break up the
Federation in the late 1950s.
Leaders of the various West African independence
movements hotly debated the governmental structure that could
best serve the .component parts of FWA after liberation.
Some political leaders, such as Felix Houphouet-Boigny
of Ivory Coast, pressed for individual statehood for each of
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the colonial units.

Leopold Senger of Senegal, on the other

hand, decried this plan as serving to balkanize West Africa,
and thereby lose all political strength in dealing with
the former colonial power.

2

In 1958 the breakup of FWA began, a constitutional
referendum vote gave Guinea its independence that year.

Soon

after, former FWA colonies, French Sudan, Upper Volta, and
Dahomey (Benin) attempted to form the Federation of Mali.

3

The Federation lasted only two months, thereafter the
balkanization of West Africa became a reality.
This is not to say that the ex-French colonies have not
maintained close international ties.

Indeed, all but Mali

and Mauritania continue to share common currency and a
central banking system.
British colonial policy stood in stark contrast to
French policy.

Unlike the colonies of the FWA, no British

colonies held contiguous borders.

This separation helps to

explain British policy of separate administration in each of
its colonies.

The interwar policy of "indirect rule" served

to maintain and reinforce traditional administrative areas
based on the rule of the traditional ethnic leaders.

4

The British colonies had participated in some common
institutions, including a common currency, but this system
began to break up after the independence of Ghana in 1957.

5

Today only an educational institution, the West African
Examination Board, remains, and now includes Liberia as well.
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POST-INDEPENDENCE DEVELOPMENTS
As new nations, comprised of hundreds of different
ethnic groups, the West African states had a difficult task
of nation building, developing institutions and instilling
nationalism.

Establishing legitimacy has not been easy, most

of the ECOWAS states have experienced at least one coup
attempt, even in the past seven-year period since the founding
of ECOWAS.
At the same time staggering poverty and weak economies
have inspired the states to consider economic cooperation
among themselves as a strategy for development.

As of 1975

over 30 bilateral and multilateral development agreements of
various sorts have been signed by the West African states.

6

Until ECOWAS, most plans had followed lines of colonial
heritage.

Exclusively francophone groups comprised over one-

third of the total.

There were few alignments limited to

strictly British heritage membership.

It has been argued

that these limited regional plans, mostly unsuccessful, were
actually extensions of pre-independence groupings and did
not represent a new and independent movement of West African
states toward integration.

7

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ECOWAS
There are several historical reasons why ECOWAS was
formed in 1975.

These reasons may be relevant to the
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potential success of ECOWAS.
The death of Charles De Gaulle in 1970 is cited as one
historical factor which marked the decline of French attention
on West Africa.

Left alone, the francophone states held a

freer. hand to pursue their own policies and to look to other
states for cooperative endeavors.

8

Some francophone states have attempted to form an
exclusive Economic Community.

The 1973 version of this effort

became the Communite Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO).
This community was criticized by several francophone
states, who maintained that no viable economic community
could be formed without the participation of Liberia and the
ex-British colonies, especially the "African Giant," Nigeria . 9
Opposition to the CEAO was so strong that Togo and Benin
refused to be partners to it.
N~geria,

a member of OPEC, dwarfs the other West African

states in many key statistical indicators.

Both its GNP and

population count for over 50% of West African aggregate
totals.

Inclusion of Nigeria was vital for any true community

of West African states, yet its very presence opened up new
areas of integration problems based on its sheer dominance
of the regional economy.
For Nigeria itself, membership in ECOWAS was an
important policy consideration designed to bury the animosity
between it and several neighboring francophone states who had
backed Biafra during the Nigerian civil war, 1968-1970.

10
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Participation in ECOWAS was the perfect vehicle for Nigeria
to work back into normalized relations with those states and
at the same time establish economic ties that could benefit
its developing industries, helping to shore up alternate
revenue sources against the inevitable decline in oil
production.
Another important factor which has been credited as an
aid to ECOWAS is the Lome Convention of 1973-1975.

11

Before the Lome Convention the ex-French colonial
states participated in specialized trade relationships with
the EEC under the Yaounde Convention agreements.

For West

African states this meant that ex-French colonies traded with
the EEC under different tariff regimes than the ex-British
and Liberia.

No form of concerted trading policies between

West Africa and the EEC could be considered under

Yaound~.

As most West African states .trade heavily with the EEC,
this extra-regional barrier to cooperation probably could
have served as a sufficient obstacle to any inclusive West
African Economic Union.
The Lome Convention agreements changed this situation.
West African states now deal on equal footing with the EEC
in matters of import and export quotas and tariff levels,
allowing at least the possibility of successful intraregional
cooperation in dealings with the EEC.
Moreover, what the Lome Convention provided the West
African states was experience in concerted negotiating.
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After eighteen months of negotiations, 493 formal meetings,
and 350 joint documents, the West African representatives had
gained valuable experience in working together and establishing
a common policy against an extraregional entity.
ation'continues today.

12

Collabor-

There is an ambassadorial committee

from ECOWAS accredited to the EEC which is charged with
managing ECOWAS member negotiations in the upcoming Lome II
round of talks.

13

Finally, a provision in the Lorn~ Convention Agreement
will add to the potential for success of ECOWAS.

Within the

treaty is an aid package with provisions that ten percent of
dispersed aid is to be allotted to regional development
projects.

These can be administered through the ECOWAS

framework and the regional aid clause hints to the importance the
states set on regional activities.
ECOWAS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION MODELS
We can speak of the ECOWAS integration scheme as a
"Third Generation" model.
The first generation of regional development is embodied
in the European Community.

Through its example and the floods

of theoretical work that helped formulate and evaluate it,
the European Community appears as an example of the success
that is possible for nations who are willing to cooperate in
an economic community.

The EEC was specifically cited as a

source of inspiration by General Yabuku Gowon, head of Nigeria
in 1975 and one of the chief proponents of ECOWAS.

14
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Second Generation integration schemes appeared in many
parts of the developing world as well as West Africa.

They

were typically formed soon after independence, before the
individual states had managed to solidify internal, national
institutions.
The East African Community (EAC), 1967-1977, of Kenya,
Tanzania, and Uganda serves as an example of what problems
were typically encountered by Second Generation schemes.
The treaty which formed the EAC failed to address many
areas of key economic and development issues, including
planning for industrial and agricultural production.

15

The

chief distinction between the EAC member states was the
relative development of Kenya over the poorer conditions of
the other two states.
In

integration theory for developing states it is

assumed that, without advance contingency planning to the
contrary, the opening of neighboring markets will tend to
enhance the economy of the most developed state while
gouging the production levels of the poorer members.

New

industries will congregate in those areas where processes and
infrastructure have already been developed.
The EAC remedy for this situation was a failure.

16

The

EAC developed a Transfer Tax system which,· in effect, backfired;
its purpose was to protect fledgling industries in the poorer
states from undue competition.

The end result however,

instead of a number of complementary industries located in
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the various states, was a duplication of industries which
developed for protected domestic markets.

Kenya retained its

position of dominance and indeed increased its share of the
wealth during the EAC period.
Agreement for adjustment of this problem and others was
made exceptionally difficult because ultimate authority rested
with the national leaders.

Any decision became highly

politicized and an issue for national pride.

17

Agreement

among professional bureaucrats below the focus of political
decision making was impossible in the EAC.

The states were

also divided along ideological lines, a feature which added
to negotiation tensions.
The EAC treaty was designed to regulate activity
between market economies and the adjustments accorded by
price manipulation.

The socialist economy of Tanzania

required state planning mechanisms to set price levels.
problem added to EAC conflicts.

This

18

Finally, the EAC failed to successfully manage its
regional balance of payments adjustment problems.

There was

no framework for allowing imbalances to float for extended
periods and therefore any intraregional commercial ventures
were hindered in their need for financial transaction liquidity .19
ECOWAS could look at these shortfalls as problem areas
that should be accounted for to help insure the possibility
of success for a third world integration scheme.
ECOWAS also had the example of another Second Generation
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integration effort, CARICOM, a Carribean regional body, to
consider.

Essentially CARICOM's problems have been in the

area of income adjustment due to trade imbalances and in
the area of intraregional trade.

ECOWAS officials met with

CARICOM representatives to discuss the potential problems
presented by integration efforts.

20

More at home, ECOWAS also had the example of earlier
integration attempts within West Africa to consider.

The

many bilateral and multilateral schemes have been typified
by one critic as "regionalism by declaration."

21

But new

schemes are acting to capitalize on the experience gained in
earlier efforts at integration.

Efforts that are to be

valued for the experience they afforded the growing cadre of
national bureaucrats in dealing with international negotiations
and relations..

22
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CHAPTER IV
OBSTACLES TO ECOWAS SUCCESS
The ECOWAS treaty proposes:
The creation of a homogeneous society, leading to
the unity of the countries of West Africa, by the
elimination of all types of obstacles to the free
movement of goods, capital and persons. 1
Through an economic union the treaty members hope to
improve the standard of living in their respective states.
While the realization of this union is fraught with physical
and political roadblocks, it can be seen from the issues
which received immediate attention in the ECOWAS body where
the priority issues lie.

Transport, communications, and the

establishment of a Customs Union were the key topics in early
negotiations.

2

As physical barriers to increased interaction the
problems of transport and communications are paramount.
Colonial infrastructure was designed solely to facilitate
transport of goods to and from the heartland to the major
trading posts.

There were no infrastructure provisions

linking the various colonial outposts.

Many of the existing

roads follow a route designed to circumvent areas of differing colonial heritage or currency zone.

3

The telecommunications network remains similar to that
of colonial days.

In many cases cross-colonial region
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telephone calls must be routed through London and Paris.

4

The serious repercussion from this problem is that
intraregional trade development is hobbled as transportation
and communication costs prohibit economies of scale to be
realized.

5

Comparative advantage for production is lost in

high transportation costs, serving to turn market processes
inward toward the national economy and decreasing the attractiveness of a region-wide economic scheme.
What has ECOWAS done to address these pressing topics?
A telecommunications project is in fact the first major
accomplishment of ECOWAS.

The first ECOWAS Fund loan went to

Mali after the 1983 ECOWAS summit meeting in May.

The loan

is to fund the first phase of a regional telecommunications
network.

Other regional members are also scheduled for fund

allocations.

6

Progress has also been made on the free movement of
persons between all ECOWAS states.

Today citizens of any

ECOWAS state have the right to travel to fellow member states
without the special entry visa required of other international
travelers.

This privelege is similar to that enjoyed by the

citizens of the EEC states.
It is within the context of the Protocol of the Free
Movement of Persons that the most significant test of the
ECOWAS organization to date was played out.

This conflict

was the expulsion by Nigeria of an estimated 2 million aliens
in January and February 1983.

The expulsion was principally
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aimed at one million Ghanaians who had remained in Nigeria
beyond the limits of their legal welcome.

The incident is

significant for several reasons which actually look positive
·for

ECOWAS as a regional organization.
Nigeria couched its announcement of expulsion in the

terms of the protocol, according to which citizens of ECOWAS
states may enter co-member countries for up to ninety days
without a visa, providing they do not seek employment.

7

The

millions of aliens, who had come to Nigeria for a share of
the oil financed economic boom in the early80's, had broken
the terms of the protocol on both counts, seeking employment
and remaining over ninety days.

The action taken by Nigeria

therefore was carried out within the letter, if not the
spirit, of the law.
It was rumored that internal political considerations
led to the expulsion.
employed electorate.

August elections required a happy,
With oil prices slipping and employment

dropping, the aliens were ejected to make jobs for Nigerian
citizens.
Within the ECOWAS body the significance of this action
is seen in the reaction of Nigeria's fellow members.

While

outcry centered on the harsh conditions of the order immediate enforcement - there was only limited objection to
the legal nature of the order.

At all times Nigeria followed

the terms of the protocol and acted within its confines.
At the ECOWAS summit meeting held in May there was no
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official condemnation of the act and in terms of intramember
relations the affair has been dropped.

8

Thus we have witnessed the significant application of
Regional Law which, while causing hardship to many member
states, was essentially supported by those it was directed
against.

Through this action we may be witnessing the

evolution of a community spirit that endorses collective
agreements even at the expense of individual gain.

Economic integration implies the importance of trade
relationships.

Here ECOWAS has acted to balance the many

divergent features of the region in an effort to improve the
groundwork for intraregional development.
Theoretical discussion of integration considers
relations as potentially difficult between the following
conditions in West Africa:
1) Richer and Poorer States
2) States divergent along linguistic, colonial and political
lines
3) States who are also members of other West African regional
groupings.
There are also issues of trade adjustment payments to
be considered.
To deal with the relations between the "rich" and poor
states, ECOWAS has established a Compensation Fund designed
to make financial adjustments to those states who experience
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economic loss due to the elimination of tariff barriers.

9

Although no claims have been made against it yet, the
very existence of the Compensation Fund should be of importance to the poorer states as they are expected to suffer
short-term loss from the Customs Union due to reduced
production levels and lost state revenues.

One analyst

typified an ECOWAS without a compensation fund as a "fool's
market" for bhe poorer states.

10

This is one issue area where

the EAC failed but where ECOWAS, learning from the mistakes
of earlier integration efforts, may succeed.
The elimination of tariffs, which began in early 1982,
is one area where planning and foresight were required to
work out an equitable system of financial distribution of
costs.

Tariffs have served as a major source of income for

many of the ECOWAS states and their elimination will require
compensation if the various governments are to cooperate with
the plans of the integration design (see Table II) .
The ECOWAS formula for redistribution is a function
of GNP and'population.
on their ability to pay.

States are assessed payments based
The funds collected ara redistributed

based on need arid loss of revenue.
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TABLE II
IMPORT DUTIES AS PROPORTION OF REVENUES FOR SOME
ECOWAS STATES FOR SELECTED YEARS
Benin
Gambia
Ghana
Ivory Coast
Liberia
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Togo
Upper Volta

1971
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1968
1973
1973
1973

55.0
35.0
10.4
19.4
18.9
26.7
10.5
18.3
43.4
30.9
19.9
45.0

(Source: Renninger, Multinational Cooperation in
West Afr ic a , p . 4 9 )
Some states find themselves in allegiance with other,
smaller regional organizations as well as ECOWAS.
The CEAO is the strongest of these and the organization
with which ECOWAS must settle its differences.

This collection

of francophone states is designed to promote regional development among its members through an eventual Customs Union
and reduction in tariff barriers.

Problems arise when

considerations of trade between CEAO/ECOWAS states and ECOWAS
states is involved.
Unlike ECOWAS, the CEAO framework maintains some tariff
structures between member states.
trouble here.

There is a potential for

Intra-CEAO trade may be subject to tariff

considerations while CEAO member trade with the larger group
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of non-CEAO ECOWAS states in some goods will pass tarifffree.

11

While ECOWAS members are compelled to "eliminate the
incompatibilities established" by membership in other subregional schemes, the continued developments of CEAO may
eventually pose a problem as ECOWAS becomes fully operational
in the late 1980's.
Official

12

CEAO

statements and publications by the CEAO

are conspicuous by their complete failure to mention ECOWAS
and the potentials for conflict and cooperation that exist.
The CEAO fails to consider ECOWAS as a cooperating partner in
a list which includes dozens of other international organizations.

13

Many of the CEAO states are also members of the CFA, a
currency union.

These close ties have led some analysts to

suggest that the CEAO may be the West African
with the best chance of success.

14

organization

However, in early 1983,

francophone regional leaders, Sekou Toure of Guinea and Abdou
Diouf of Senegal, publically suggested that the CEAO be
phased out to make room for ECOWAS.

15

ECOWAS has shown some advancement in settling the
problem of balance of payments adjustments among the member
states, an advance that may neutralize to some degree the
unique relationship shared by the CFA states.
Again due to their colonial heritage, the ECOWAS states
have been hampered in their efforts to promote intraregional
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trade by the fact that many of their national currencies
were linked directly to their colonial powers, even after
independence.

In west Africa, currencies were not directly

convertible to other regional currencies.

16

Like telephone links, monetary exchanges often required
payment adjustments to be performed through the European
capitals.
Today there exists the West African Clearing House,
which is designed to facilitate intraregional trade by making
exchange possible through the utilization of a West African
Unit of Account monetary unit, which is equivelant to the
World Bank's Special Drawing Right Unit.
Through the Clearing House, national Central Banks
settle exchange transactions by a system similar to the
clearing function performed by national Central Banks clearing
checks submitted by commercial banks.

17

This procedure saves

on much needed foreign exchange which can now be employed to
settle debts with extra-regional states.
Osagie notes this system has actually been a substantial
inroad against national sovereignty in the area of international finance.

The official exchange rates of the member

states are now determined by a regional, ECOWAS affiliated,
organization.

18

The Clearing House too is hindered in its duties by the
problem of infrastructure.

In a perfect example of regional

project linkage, communications problems have kept Clearing
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House achievements lagging behind potential.

Basic

communication difficulties have kept exchange settlements
strapped to a three month adjustment period once funds are
submitted for transfer.

19

Until the basic problems of communication are settled,
it would appear that further developments in trade will
continue to fall below expected goals.

The ECOWAS tele-

communications scheme may have strong forward linkages for
these development goals.
Much has been made of the divergent nature of the
various ECOWAS states.

Some offer those differences as

substantial factors for failure of ECOWAS, while others gloss
over them and suggest that there is political motivation to
overcome these hurdles.
·~

20

ECOWAS states differ along lines of political ideology.

This difference was not found among the EEC

states where

homogeneity may have aided in its establishment and relative
success.

21

Among the ECOWAS states we find communist,

socialist, military, and democratic states,
constitutional combinations.

in a variety of

While these differences have

not appeared as a problem in specific ECOWAS statements there
would seem to be at least a potential for conflict because of
this divergence.
In the context of extra-regional relations, the ECOWAS
states have recently failed to demonstrate any unified policy
position.

Division is occurring along lines analysts are
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calling "Moderates and Radicals." 22
The most recent evidence of this failure to present a
unified front, a failure endemic among the African states in
general, is the record of the 1982 Sessions of the Organization
of African Unity (OAU).

In both August and November,

scheduled meetings of the OAU could not be convened because
a quorum could not be generated.

23

Under the chairmanship of Quadaffi of Libya, intensely
sensitive issues were presented, embodied in credentials
conflicts.

In August, the question was the right of

representation of Spanish Sahara.

In November, the divisive

issue was the de jure leadership for Chad.
These questions split the ECOWAS states.

Those who

were considered "moderates:" Nigeria, Niger, Gambia, Upper
Volta, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Liberia, Senegal, and Sierra
Leone, refused invitations to be seated.

24

Some states

refused to appear, others would not register as official
delegates.
While pushed to the apparent brink of crisis, the OAU
rift was mended, for a time, by ECOWAS initiative.

Preceding

the third attempt to convene a quorum in June 1983, Sekou
Toure, the chairman of ECOWAS at the time, sent to the OAU
a resolution of the ECOWAS states pledging to appear at the
scheduled meeting in Addis Ababa.

25

At this point the

political questions of Southwest Sahara and Chad had been
surpassed by issues of basic African solidarity.

In the
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final moment ECOWAS was able to speak out in a unanimous and
collective voice in support of the OAU.

It is significant

that the decision to attend the OAU conference by the sixteen
states was made within the context of ECOWAS solidarity and
that the announcement to attend was made collectively, with
one voice speaking for all.
This action may be an indication of ECOWAS solidarity,
despite earlier displays of brinksmanship, and an affirmation
of a true regional spirit.
What is clear, however, is that on such occasions where
unity as a symbolic gesture is at issue, the ECOWAS states
are today slow to present a unified position.

This may serve

as a symbol of the deep chasm that politically divides the
ECOWAS states, as well as the continent in general.

These

differences could become institutionalized if the predicted
establishment of a

11

Radical" African organization is actually

brought about by Quadaffi.

26

If this occurs it would probably

split ECOWAS along Radical-Moderate lines.

To date, however,

divisions have not been pushed to this point.
As if the political divisions were not difficult enough,
a further complication in West African intra-regional relations·
stems from the almost remarkable political instability of many
of the member states.
In November 1982, both Upper Vol ta and Ghana experienced
coup attempts.

For a time both states closed their borders,

even to fellow ECOWAS states.

In 1980 the present leader of
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Liberia, Staff Sergeant Doe was refused admission to the
ECOWAS summit meeting because of his rise to power through
assassination.

27

ECOWAS states in conflict do not always seek out ECOWAS
involvement, even when looking for solutions through international constitutional channels.

A border dispute that has

continued for eight years between Mali and Upper Volta has
been placed before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
for

a ruling.

Significantly, however, the two states are

expected to nominate a single ad hoc judge from Senegal, a
fellow ECOWAS member, thus demonstrating a willingness to
deal collectively with a regional peer.

28

The ad hoc judge

will be forced to take sides on the merits of the case.

More

contentious states would have avoided the ICJ or at least
would have appointed individual ad hoc judges.
Political instability may, however, make this smooth
legalistic solution impossible.

Repeated coups in Upper Vol ta

may drastically affect that government's ability to draft an
effective compromis for presentation to the Court. 29
Since the founding of ECOWAS, a number of other regional
incidents have checkered the relations among the ECOWAS states.
Below is a sampling of incidents from 1980 to present:
Guinea/Guinea-Bissau • • .

. Conflict over territorial waters

Cape Verde/Guinea-Bissau • . nnif ication plans broken
Liberia • • • • • • . • . • • Temporarily banned from ECOWAS.
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SUMMARY
This overview of the prevailing relations in the ECOWAS
region, its problems of infrastructure and politicsJ . should
serve as an example of the difficult obstacles which ECOWAS
will face if it is to be a successful integration scheme.

It

has many hurdles to pass over before it can establish itself
as an institution in West African regional relations.
As was observed earlier, the extended time span over
which the ECOWAS plan is layed out may serve as an adjustment
period during which the many differences which separate the
ECOWAS states can be papered over.
These divisions do not doom ECOWAS to failure, and the
experience of the EEC demonstrates that relations can
continue along lines of agreement while other policy lines
are not followed through.

While political integration is

seen as the ultimate step in the ideal integration process,
not even the EEC has approached that level of cooperation and
there is little chance that they will ever choose to politically integrate.

There are, however, various degrees of

integration that can be accomplished within the EEC and
ECOWAS.
The remaining chapters of this study will attempt a
profile of ECOWAS integration through quantitative analyses
of several integration indicators.

It is hoped that these

indicators will aid in the assessment of the state of
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integration in West Africa today as well as serve as a set
of base line values for further analysis as ECOWAS becomes
fully operational in later years.
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CHAPTER V
TRADE PATTERNS OF THE ECOWAS STATES
It is

~he

hope of the sixteen member states that

participation in an economic community will enhance their
potential for development through a "determined and concerted
policy of self-reliance."

1

Regional self-reliance implies a strong network of
trade between the member states.

In turn an integration of

decision making processes in the areas of economic production
and development may arise.

2

This chapter will focus on intraregional trade as a
transaction indicator, indeed the indicator that has been
employed for measuring the strength of regional integration,
or at least regional interdependence.

3

It will be argued

that by disaggregation of trade information a more accurate
method for assessing ECOWAS integration potential and
achievement is developed.
Clearly trade relations and their intensity stand as
intuitively appealing measures of interdependence.

Alker and

Puchala demonstrated the validity of the use of trade data as
an indicator of political integration.

4

Do increasing levels of trade cause expanded regional
integration?

The answer remains unclear, none-the-less these

analysts maintained that trade data could serve as a general
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indicator of the strength of regional relations as well as
their adjustment and change.
Of course another reason analysts have relied on trade
data in assessing regional interdependence intensity is
their availability.

5

Trade data are · among the few aggregate indicators that
are readily available for the ECOWAS states.

This availability

allows up-to-date reporting of some trade features and the
ability to employ over-time analysis for the evaluation of
ECOWAS integration.
It should be cautioned that these data, while useful
for comparative measurement, at this time will serve best as
a collection of base line values for later study.

By ECOWAS

Treaty provision official trade liberalization began only
three years ago (1981) with the elimination of protective
tariffs between member

state~

(see below).

The following table demonstrates the schedule as
provided for by the ECOWAS Treaty.
TABLE III
TRADE LIBERALIZATION TIME TABLE

1981
1984
1988
1990

-

Elimination of Protective Internal Taxes
Elimination of Import Duties
Establishment of Common Customs Tariff
Alignment of National Tariffs to Common
External Customs

(Source: West Africa 25 May 1981, p.1159)
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Recent theoretical work in the area of interdependence
measurement has expanded even further into the realm of
economics.

It has been argued that a better indicator of

interdependence is the association of price determinants.
If one state's economic policies, trade levels, and commodity
prices, effect the price levels of another state, and viceversa, then this is held to be an indication of interdependence between the states so affected.

6

The validity of this assertion has been argued back and
forth in successive publications and one suspects that the
argument is not over.

7

This cont~nued controversy serves to

question the utility of an in-depth factor price study here;
what eliminates it is the lack of ·data.
In the context of third world integration schemes it
has been argued that most are doomed to failure because intraregional trade is negligible when compared to extra-regional
trade.
The implication is that without high intraregional trade
states have no compelling reason to further their integration
efforts.

Ties will be tenuous at best.

In most third world states, economic output is heavily
based on primary product exports.

These states maintain a

largely monoproduct trade relationship with one or several
developed states, exporting raw materials and importing
finished products.

Intraregional trade is low because the

regional states often produce the same products and little
else.
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In the case of the ECOWAS states the level of intraregional trade can be seen in Table IV.

Each cell presents

the percentage of bilateral trade as measured by imports and
exports for the years 1975 and 1981, computed in constant
dollar figures.
The figures are percentages and present measures of
relative strength.

Thus, imports of a "rich" state of equal

dollar value to those of a poorer state will be noted in a
smaller percentage figure.

Interpretation of percentage

figures requires that the data be read along the rows for
each state.
Clearly the figures show that intraregional trade, as
a percentage of the region's overall world trade, is not very
high.

There are some interesting bilateral relationships

that display rather strong trade, of particular note are the
high percentages of trade some poor states display with other,
relatively better off states.

8

Upper Volta and Mali trade

heavily with Ivory Coast.
While trade levels are often low, Table V demonstrates
that at least some trade is occurring in many of the possible
bilateral combinations;

(+) denotes recorded trade less than

one percent of the state's total trade.

It is evident that

many avenues of trade are open.
J.C. Aghaji maintains that international trade in the
ECOWAS region remains divided along linguistic lines of
colonial heritage.

9

Tables IV and V do not bear this out.

54

Le~end:

Tables IV and V
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Ghana does have many small trade avenues open with the francophone

ECOWAS states.

Also, Nigeria's export patterns, due

to its important oil resources, do not support Aghaji's
contentions.
Nigeria is the major oil supplier for eight of the
ECOWAS states. 10

It may, however, be surprising to learn

that some regional states import their oil from Venezuala and
Kuwait instead of from neighboring ECOWAS member Nigeria.

11

In the final assessment, however, intraregional trade,
as a percentage of overall trade is very low, less than 4%.

12

Analyses of this sort have been conducted for most
integration schemes and their focus on overall trade interaction invariably leads to conclusions similar to those of
H. Monte Hill in his study of the Association of East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) .

13

Hill employed RA analysis, developed by Savage and
Deutsch, to measure integration by the quantitative indicators:
mu tu a 1 trade , student exchange 1eve1 s ,, and tour i st des t in at ions . 14
His negative conclusions concerning ASEAN integration in
trade were explained as evidence of,
the need of those Nations for manufactured products
which are not produced in the region. 15
He summarizes his study with the conclusion that,
There appears to be no movement whatsoever toward
regional community formation among the five ASEAN
countries as reflected in their relative acceptance
scores. 16
Hill's conclusion may be true, but I think it leads us
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to an improper evaluation of a developing state integration
scheme.

We could not expect transactions of this kind to be

high among states at such low levels of development.
To look at overall trade intensity when the states
under study produce principally the same commodity exports
for developed markets; student exchanges between countries
with few universities, none of which compare to the better
universities in the developed states; and to examine tourism
between poor countries when more attractive visits to
developed states are available, leads us to improper conclusions.

These measures are invalid because they employ

indicators of integration which misrepresent the context of
third world integration schemes.
One could argue that limitations of this magnitude doom
integration efforts which exhibit these characteristics.
Analysts often assess integration schemes in absolute terms,
it may, however, be more realistic and fruitful to weigh
integration efforts by their potential for degrees of
interdependence.
Potential degrees differ among various regions and it
is the relative level that should rest as the mark by which
individual nation groupings should be judged.
Cantori and Spiegel consider an element of this in their
calculation of economic complimentarity in a number of
geographic regions.

Their ranking is as follows:
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West Europe
Latin America
The Middle East
West Africa
Southeast Asia
Source:

Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel, The International Politics
of Regions: A Comparative Approach (Englewood Cliffs Prentice
Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 50.

By their comparative analysis West Africa has a very
low level of complimentarity.

We can therefore expect

absolute potential to be very low, yet within this analysis
there is some range of activity where these nations can
interact.

They can develop their potential for trade,

possibly increasing that potential as the region develops.
Turning to consideration of potential for degrees of
interdependence, it may be a better avenue of analysis to
follow the lead of R.J.G. Wells.

17

Wells notes the continued reference to low overall
intraregional trade and the production of similar primary
products among the members of ASEAN.

Wells, however, opens

up new avenues of analysis with his proposition,
if a degree of disaggregation is carried out it is
possible to detect differences in resource endowments
and to provide evidence of complimentarity. 18
If this point of view is carried over to an analysis of
the ECOWAS states it can be observed that while these nations
often produce the same primary products, which have little
utility for non-industrialized states, there are still
avenues of potential trade open.
The following figures show the ECOWAS states are not
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all equally oriented toward monoproduct output.

It will be

shown that the more diversified states participate more fully
in intraregional trade.
To turn to Wells' notion of complimentary products, we
ask: is there an intraregional demand for the nonprimary
product exports of the ECOWAS states?
This analysis may help us to assess the degree of
interdependence in ECOWAS that has been achieved in the past
leading to a measure which can be employed in the future as
a base line for further analysis.
The information for this portion of the study is
derived from the U.N. publication, Commodity Trade Statistics.
Published each year, its goal is to collect trade data from
all member states.
Even this publication suffers from inadequate data
from the ECOWAS states.

Balancing the need for comprehensive

coverage and a recent time period, a compromise was reached
in reporting data for 1972.
Trade figures for the following states are included:
Benin
Ghana
Ivory Coast
Mali
Mauritania

Niger
Senegal
Togo
Upper Volta

As Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau had not achieved
independence from Portugal in 1972 this study accounts for
nine of the fourteen independent states for that year.
Later editions for subsequent years report the trade
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figures for independent Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Liberia,
Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.

Strict comparability is not

possible because of the time differential.

However, the data

retain validity as a series of base line measures.

Figures

for Guinea and Cape Verde have not been reported during the
period 1970-1980 and therefore none are

i~cluded.

Ultimately

information for fourteen of the sixteen member states was
considered in the study.
By removing the Primary Product exports of the ECOWAS
states we can consider the trade patterns of the member
~tates'

other export products, noting intesity and direc-

tion. For most states what remains are Basic Manufactures,
Machines, and Transport Equipment.

Two of the more advanced

states, Senegal and Ivory Coast, also export Chemical Products,
while Niger and Upper Volta export Food Products to their
regional partners.

19

Of those states under consideration it is basically the
"rich" states, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone and two of the
poorest states, Mauritania and Gambia, which display very low
percentage levels of exports within the region.
The link between these states is the fact that they
read as a near complete list of states with high levels of
single product exports; see table above.

Only Liberia, also

a strong monoproduct exporter, upsets the list by also exporting
a notable measure of trade within the ECOWAS region.
It can still be noted that these states as well as
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Guinea all import from a number of ECOWAS states, these
imports are included as other member's exports.
Considering the ECOWAS states' exports in this way,
some very revealing information appears.

Table VI demonstrates

the export percentages of the ECOWAS states among themselves
and to other states and state groups.
TABLE VI
SELECTED COMMODITY TRADE FOR 9 ECOWAS STATES

Benin
Guinea-Bissau*
Ivory Coast
Liberia
Mali
Niger
Senegal
Togo
Upper Volta

ECOWAS

Unknown
African

60%
76%
53%
49%
89%
75%
68%
42%
95%

10%
9%
3%
6%
1%
1%
1%
14%
1%

France

Other
Develope_d
States

ExtraRegional
African

12%
15%
19%
33%
3%
13%
7%
38%
2%

17%

17%
5%
9%
17%
5%
2%

8%
13%
2%
2%
7%

*1976 data

Only Togo and Liberia export a notable percent of the
goods under consideration to an extra-regional group, in this
case developed states other than France.
Among the African markets the ECOWAS states do not
trade with extra-regional states to any appreciable level.
Some African trade appears in the category "Unknown African,"
no knowledge of destination is available for these percentages,
or how to divide them among regions.

Fortunately this un-

accounted for category does not represent a sizeable share
of the trade percentages.
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Overall compilation in Table VII shows that 69% of the
non-primary product trade was within the ECOWAS region in
1972.
TABLE VII
1972
DIRECTION OF TOTAL TRADE
FOR SELECTED COMMODITIES

ECOWAS
69%

Unknown
African
2%

France

Other
Developed
States

13%

11%

Extra-Regional
African
5%

This analysis of course makes no pretension to present
this figure as evidence of successful integration or strong
interdependence among the ECOWAS states.

It does, however,

point out that the states do trade with each other in
identifiable patterns and exports of secondary domestic
production tend to go to the neighboring ECOWAS states.
This may say something for the level of potential trade
within the West African region in 1972 and the level of that
potential that was achieved.
I will be quick to note that this trade accounts for a
small percentage of the ECOWAS states' overall trade and
therefore the level of economic impact of these relations is
likely to be small at this time.

The figures do, however,

serve as an indicator of what is needed for increased interdependence among the member states.
The avenues of trade are open.

It is low industrial output

and the problems that inhibit distribution that appear to be
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the restraints to further trade.

This trade does not need

to be redirected--turned inward toward the group--rather the
levels of overall production need to be increased.
It may be that through increased governmental cooperation
within the ECOWAS framework this increase in production will
begin.
There are physical barriers to increased interaction.
Problems of transport and communications are paramount. The
installed colonial infrastructure was designed solely to
facilitate transport of goods to and from the heartland and
major trading ports.

There were no infrastructure provisions

linking the various colonial outposts.

Many of the existing

roads follow a route designed to circumvent areas of differing
colonial heritage or currency zone.

20

The telecommunications network remains similar to that
of colonial days.

In many cases cross colonial-zone telephone

calls must be routed through London and Paris.

21

The serious repercussion from this situation is that
the potential for increased intraregional trade development
is hobbled.
Transportation and communication costs prohibit economies
of scale, concentrating large production processes at the site
of raw materials and supplying region-wide markets, to be
realized.

22

Comparative advantage for production is lost in

high transportation costs, serving to turn market processes
inward to the national economy and decreasing the attractiveness
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of a region-wide economic scheme.
Analysis of what ECOWAS has done to relieve these
infrastructure problems may be an avenue for assessing the
progress of ECOWAS.
With the present information we can conclude that at
least some of the ECOWAS members reached a respectable
fulfillment of their potential for intraregional trade.

This

measure of interdependence may serve as a base line value
for future assessments of ECOWAS interdependence.
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CHAPTER VI
TREATY RELATIONSHIPS OF THE ECOWAS STATES
Because nations formalize many of their mutual associations in the form of treaties it should be instructive to
investigate the treaty patterns of the ECOWAS member states.
Treaties as data may be analysed in a number of ways.
Individual treaties can be examined, their textual provisions
noted for specific features which may imply particular
relationships between the signatory states.

Treaties may

also be used as a source of quantifiable data.

Here one

could observe the direction and frequency of a state's
treaties.

1

Quantitative analyses of treaty data have been performed
concerning several states and regions of the world.

2

Here,

treaty analysis will be used to establish the treaty patterns
of the ECOWAS states.

These patterns should aid in the

assessment of the potential for success of the ECOWAS
integration scheme.
Peter Rohn suggests that treaty data offer a refined
view of the relations of the world's states.

They offer a

data set which has: universality, all nations make treaties;
~eticulosity,

treaties are not haphazard associations but

specific documents which outline a state's relationship with
other nations; and parsimony, treaties are a rarified activity
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which encapsules a state's relationships with the world in
concise fashion.

3

Subject to qualification, treaty data satisfy the
requirement of availability for the states of West Africa.
Article 102 of the United Nations Charter stipulates that
member states must register any treaty they are party to
with the Secretariate of the U.N., who in turn is obligated
to publish all treaties registered.

4

For a variety of

reasons not all treaties are registered with the U.N. or any
other data source.

5

Beyond this general problem which is shared by all
members of the U.N. in varying degrees, there are exceptional
registration problems exhibited by third world states in
general and African states in particular.

6

While this problem might effect any advanced statistical
investigations it should still be of some utility to note the
treaty patterns of the ECOWAS states.

Are there clear-cut

patterns which may offer evidence of the magnitude and
importance of the members' relations with other nations of
the world?
Of special interest will be extra-regional treaty
patterns with former colonial powers, ideologically aligned
states and states of religious affinity.

Of course intra-

regional patterns will also be investigated.

The treaty data

will be investigated in toto and over time.
An examination of the EEC experience displays an interesting
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phenomenon.

During the post-war period of the late 1940s

and early 1950s there was a marked increase in the number of
bilateral treaties established between the future EEC member
states.

The European states found that increased interaction

required an expanded network of formalized relationships.
Once the framework of the regional organization was established,
however, there was actually a drop in the absolute frequency
of bilateral treaties drafted among the member states, as can
be seen from Figure 1.
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Apparently those international relationships that were
once formalized by treaty began to fall within the range of
competence of the EEC machinery.

8

The supranational organ-

ization now serves as a sort of permanent bargaining table
where relations can be formalized in an institutional framework.
Clearly this is an example of the integration process
at work and a phenomenon that could be investigated in the
case of ECOWAS.
Observing the model presented by the EEC states we
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could expect an increase in the magnitude of intra-regional
treaty making before the signature of the ECOWAS multilateral
treaty in 1975.
With regard to the ECOWAS states, however, the nature
of treaty registration precludes the effective investigation
of this r ise"'""'.drop phenomenon of treaty frequency to be performed
at this date.

Registration with the U.N. Secretariate is a

lengthy process, public knowledge of existing treaties falls
far behind their date of signature.
seven year

In 1977 there was a

lag between initial treaty reporting and actual

publication in the United Nations Treaty Series.

9

Complications extend to the record of many states in
reporting their treaty activity.
"pipeline effect."

Peter Rohn speaks of a

Treaties often go unreported to the U.N.

For any given year there is a lag between the time treaties
are established and their promulgation.

Most treaties are

reported in the first year, the remainder trickle in at a
decreasing rate.

For any given year he estimates the "pipe-

line effect" to be about seven years.

10

For this study no valid quantitative judgements can be
made about treaty distribution after 1975, the year ECOWAS
was created.

Any comparative study would bias the results

against those states who are tardy in reporting their treaties or
who do not publish their own treaty series.

For the nations

in question this would most likely overrepresent those treaties
signed with developed states, as they have a better reporting
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record than the African states.

11

Due to the pipeline effect this analysis is restricted
to investigating the possible appearance of an increase in
intra-regional treaty acitivity through 1975.

Analysis of

the expected post-1975 decline in activity will require
further investigation at a later date.
The ECOWAS states produce only two percent of the world's
treaty volume.

12

Any quantitative analysis must therefore

rely on rather large time period divisions.

This study will

examine the periods pre-1965, 1965-1969, and 1970-1975.

13

To investigate the continued process of increased
relations among the ECOWAS states, intra-regional treaties
will also be noted for the period after 1975.

However, their

frequency will not have absolute statistical validity because
we can expect other treaties of this period to be reported
at a later date.
Table VIII shows that there is little reported treaty
activity between the member states, both in the aggregate
and for any of the three time periods.

Many nations display

no bilateral treaty activity prior to 1976, and there is
rarely evidence of any increase over time.
magnitude is between Gambia and Senegal,

The only notable
an obvious feature

of their special geographic relationship (See Appendix).
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As for the post-1975 period only three bilateral treaty
relationships have been reported.

Togo now has treaty

activity with Guinea and Niger as well as two additional
treaties with Benin.

The only other reported change is anew

Air Transport treaty between Upper Volta and Mali.

14

Table IX also demonstrates that many possible bilateral
combinations show no treaty activity.
It should be noted that Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde
report no treaty activity at all before 1975, the year of
their independence from Portugal.

These two states fail to

report any bilateral treaties between themselves and the
other ECOWAS states after 1975.

This is a rather surprising

situation considering they have no formal arrangement with
their neighboring states save for the ECOWAS multilateral
treaty.
Eliminating Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde from further
considerations, there are ninety potential bilateral treaty
combinations within the region.

Of this number, however,

only 37 actual combinations have been reported.
There are too many empty cells and too few observations
for a proper chi 2 analysis to be performed but we can clearly
see that two ex-British colonies, Nigeria and Ghana have the
largest number of intra-regional treaty partners.
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Ghana is associated with 79% of the ECOWAS states by
bilateral treaty.

Notably, one of the missing relationships

is with another ex-British colony, Gambia.
relationships are with Mauritania and Niger.

Other missing
These two

states are at the low end of overall treaty frequency, with
only three and two intraregional treaties respectively.
Nigeria also has association with 79% of the possible
combinations; missing only Liberia, Mauritania, and Upper
Volta.
Interestingly, the military governments of Mauritania,
Niger, and Upper Volta, and the Marxist government of Benin
have created the fewest number of treaty partners, and even
have few treaties among themselves.

On the other hand, Ghana,

another military government, and a nation with the highest
frequency of intraregional treaties, has no treaty ties with
Mauritania or Niger.
Other potential groupings worth investigation failed to
yield any patterned analysis.

Muslim state interaction is

low, save for Mali, yet Mali has high interaction with nonMuslim states as well.
37% of the actual treaty pairs are accounted for by
three states of varying characteristics; Ghana, ex-British,
military government; Nigeria, ex-British, democratic government (at present); and Mali, ex-French, democratic government.
No pattern of treaty predominance can be discerned from this
grouping.
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An examination of the relationship between treaty
volume and GNP found a very modest, statistically significant
correlation of r

=

.62, R2

=

.39.

The above demonstrates that no overall explanation for
the distribution of treaty pairs within the region exists.
Patterns are not along lines of colonial heritage, religious
background, or government type.

Economic factors consider

only a modest source of variation.

What can be said is that

the ECOWAS states have very little treaty interaction among
themselves.

Overall treaty figures are very low and they do

not appear to be growing over time.
77% of all actual treaty related nation pairings are
linked by a single treaty.

Most of the states who have

displayed any treaty activity at all between themselves have
entered into only one bilateral treaty in fifteen years.
Of the ten multi-treaty relationships in the ECOWAS
group, Togo accounts for half.
The ECOWAS states did not display a treaty pattern even
remotely similar to that of the EEC.

If the assumption that

most interstate affairs, especially trade relationships, are
regulated by treaty is true, we must conclude that the ECOWAS
states have displayed little treaty activity which an analyst
could consider as evidence of an increased will to even interact with regional states, let alone to participate in an
integration scheme.

15

As treaty formation is a relatively easy activity and
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one that is necessary for establishing a network of formal
relationships for potential integration we must conclude that
there is compelling evidence against the possible success of
the ECOWAS integration scheme.

Intra-regional relationships

are at a minimum and do not appear to be developing over time.
Extra-regional relationships remain the most numerous
for the ECOWAS states.

Table IX displays these relationships.

Scholars of colonial relationships claim that upon
independence many states maintain their closest international
relationships with their ex-rulers.

16

The following table

shows the percentage of overall treaties six ECOWAS states
have with their ex-colonial powers.

Liberia'a special

relationship with the U.S. is also demonstrated through treaty
frequency.
TABLE X
PERCENTAGE OF OVERALL TREATY FREQUENCY FOR SELECTED
ECOWAS STATES WITH THEIR EX-COLONIAL POWERS
AND LIBERIA-U.S. TREATIES
Benin

Ivory
Coast

Mauritania

Senegal

Gambia

Liberia

62%

60%

65%

63%

56%

62%

Of interest is the variation displayed by the states
who do not follow this typical pattern of treaty relations.
Socialist Guinea shows in Table IX a large percentage
of its treaty relations to be with communist states.

Marxist

Benin, on the other hand, has retained its strongest treaty
links with France.
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Two military states, Ghana and Mali, have an evenhanded relationship with both East and West.
Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde show 33 treaties together
with Portugal, at the same time reporting no treaties with
ECOWAS states.
Table IX also demonstrates that it is the ex-French
and Portugese colonies who have maintained close ties with
their ex-rulers while three ex-British colonies have attracted
relations with other nations of the world.
This study has ignored multilateral arrangements
because bilateral activity is a better gauge of interstate
relationships.

17

Yet it should be noted that the ECOWAS states do have
a number of multilateral treaties linking the region into a
variety of sub-regional associations.

And of course ECOWAS

itself was formed by a multilateral treaty.
The ECOWAS treaty in fact established a blanket Most
Favored Nation Status for all signatories.

18

But it is

evidence of the weak hold of ECOWAS in the region that some
member states have asked for a suspension of that provision
for the time being.

19

Table XI demonstrates these multilateral relationships.
Again the criticism is voiced that most of these.relationships are
examples of "regionalism by declaration," efforts that were
easier to draft than to implement. 20
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.TABLE XI
MULTILATERAL TREATY RELATIONSHIPS
OF THE ECOWAS STATES
ECOWAS
1

Benin
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Ivory Coast
Liberia
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Togo
Upper Volta

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

2

*

OTHER TREATIES
4
3

5

6

*

*

*
*

*
*
*

*

*
*
*

*
*

*

*

*

*
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Source: Times (London), Special West Africa Supplement,
June 30, 1975, p. 2.

Through this examination of treaty patterns of the
ECOWAS states it should be clear that they have not established a
base of treaty interaction among themselves.

Many states

have no more than a few bilateral treaties spread among the
entire group of 16 states and no nation has established
bilateral treaty relations with all of its regional partners.
In comparison with the experience of the EEC states,
the pattern of increased treaty magnitude before the implementation of the EEC machinery, the magnitude of treaties
with future partners, and the treaty partner rankings of the
future members, we have the record of the ECOWAS states.
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Their record presents no evidence of increased intraregional relatioships through the examination of treaty data.
This evidence may suggest that West Africa had not prepared
a fully operational framework of associations by 1975.
Regardless of the good intentions the West African states
may have had in founding ECOWAS it can be expected that the
lack of organizational infrastructure will increase the task
ahead necessary for success.
Later analysis will be required to observe any possible
change in treaty frequency over time, mindful of course that
treaty activity may diminish as a result of successful cooptation of duties by ECOWAS institutional machinery.

The

evidence would suggest, however, that treaty formation was
still found necessary within the EEC and the magnitude was
many times over that of the ECOWAS members.
Of course the observation that ECOWAS may have formed
prematurely, before an adequate base of inter-state relations
had been developed, does not doom ECOWAS to failure.
activity may develop after 1975.

Further

We may observe, however,

that up to 1975 that involvement had not occurred and any
success will be in spite of this situation and not a result
of it.
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CHAPTER VII
ANALYSIS OF ECOWAS STATES' VOTING RECORD
IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
The record of the United Nations General Assembly Roll
Call Votes would appear to be another empirical referent for
measuring community formation among the ECOWAS states.

The

Record offers a yearly updated body of information on how
states present themselves in the international arena of the
General Assembly.
We may hypothesize a relationship, "when states are
successfully integrated they will tend to act with increasing
solidarity in their international relations with extraregional states."

This hypothesis may be tested by examining

the Voting Records of the General Assembly as reported in the
Index to the Proceedings of the General Assembly.

If the

ECOWAS states present an identifiably unique voting pattern
in relation to other African states we can say that ECOWAS
has reached a level of consensus that could facilitate
integration, or more boldly, be evidence of integration.
We will be satisfied to accept the former conclusion.
Over time studies may be employed to demonstrate change
in voting patterns.
The European Economic Community (EEC) may serve as an
example of a well established, institutionalized effort to
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maintain a united voting policy in the General Assembly.
Among the EEC members voting is coordinated through a
Political Committee and a Correspondent's Group.

1

Early examinations of U.N. voting data present a
variety of advanced statistical measures designed to identify
issue areas and nation blocs that offer evidence of grouped
voting patterns.

2

The work of Bruce Russett, Discovering Voting Groups
in the United Nations, established a new standard for Roll
Call vote analysis.

3

Employing the Q-factor varient of factor analysis,
Russett investigated the voting data for patterns of issue
alignment and state bloc voting.

This method assures total

freedom from prejudged assumptions.

Q-factor analysis

presents a basis for comparison and judgement that is:
Jnductive, interpretable, and offers gradiations.

4

Of interest for this study are the voting patterns of
the EEC members and the future members of ECOWAS discovered
by Russett.
Russett's analysis presented empirical evidence for
dividing the U.N. members into six distinct groups.
Those members of the EEC who voted in the General
Assembly, 18th Session (1963) presented themselves in a
unified factor group.

This alignment was found within the

general grouping Russett termed "Western Community."
"Community" shared a common Western heritage.

It also

This
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included many South American states as well as Nationalist
China, Iran, and Japan.
The future ECOWAS states, on the other hand, were
divided into different "communities," roughly along lines of
colonial heritage.
TABLE XII
GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTING BLOCS:
FUTURE ECm~AS STATES, 18th SESSION
Brazzaville Africans

Afro-Asians

Niger
Ivory Coast
Upper Volta
Dahomey (Benin)
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Togo
Mauritania
Liberia

Ghana
Nigeria
Mali

The appearance of francophone Mali among the AfroAsian states may be explained in part by its affiliation by
religion and location with the North African states: Algeria,
Tunisia, and Morocco, who also appear in that group.
Powers examined the voting records of the 30th Session
(1975}.

Employing the same methodology as Russett, his

analysis is perfectly compatible for comparison with Russett' s
and allows for analysis of over time change.
Powers cautions that factor scores are not useful
measures for explanation or prediction.

Rather, factor

analysis is an exploratory tool useful in making preliminary
identification of grouped variables, a "psycometric barometer
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of prevailing attitudes."

5

The examination of the 30th Session identifies a new
bloc of interest to this study.

Powers labels this new bloc

the "Developing World."
All ECOWAS states fall into this factor group except
Mauritania, which demonstrated a pattern of votes similar to
the "Muslim Community."

Other ECOWAS states: Cape Verde,

Gambia, Ivory Coast, and Liberia, were considered unclassifiable.
Failure to fit within any specific factor group was,
for Cape Verde and Gambia, due to excessive absences.

For

Ivory Coast and Liberia the explanation is more interesting.
They held factor scores balanced between the "Developing
World" and "Western" factors.

6

A position that is today

echoed in their role as "moderates" within the OAU.

7

In the 30th Session the expanded EEC is again found
within the "Western" factor group, while the Latin American
states voted in a distinct pattern of their own.
An empirical study of regional voting focused on the
EEC found that the community members voted together from 58
to 62.5 percent in the 30th, 31st, and 32nd Sessions.

8

Not

surprisingly, where the voting differed was on the "big"
issues.

9

~-

The EEC states, with a homogeneous membership and an
elaborate bureaucratic establishment designed to manage the
intricacies of negotiating and maintaining a common voting
position, could not muster a higher consensus than 62.5%
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agreement.
If U.N. voting analysis is a proper measure of a nation
group's level of consensus among themselves and their ability
to present a unified position to the other members of the
United Nations, we must conclude that the EEC has not achieved an
integration level of complete agreement.
Yet we may also conclude that, as the most successful
integration scheme to date, the institutions and voting
record of the EEC establishes a base measure by which other
integration schemes may be weighed.
Turning to the ECOWAS states we find that features
present in their voting record do not allow any advanced
statistical operations to be performed.
Analytical problems stem from two distinct features.
One, the ECOWAS states are part of the third world, which in
the last decade has constituted an "automatic majority" in
the General Assembly.

10

This majority has tended to vote in

an essentially solid bloc on most issues subject to roll call
vote.

Two, voting variation, when it occurs among ECOWAS

members as well as among other African nations, is registered
in Abstention Votes.
No previous study has addressed the nature of the
Abstention Vote in any detail.

There is little evidence to

show the intent of the Abstention Votes, which makes quantitative interpretation difficult.
Are they cast to express mild disagreement with the
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proposed resolution or to express mild support?

They are

probably used for both purposes, but how can an analyst be
sure each time that he has determined the intent correctly?
The coding employed by Russett demonstrates the amiguity of
the Abstention Vote.

11

With these complications it is impossible to utilize
Abstention Votes as a measure of voting variation within an
analysis and maintain any level of confidence in the results.
In 1976, 65 percent of all resolutions passed by roll
call vote were unanimously approved by the African states.
Of the remaining 35 percent most diversions were registered
in Abstention Votes.
An examination of the Abstention Votes presents no
discernible patterns among the ECOWAS states which distinguish
them from the other African nations.

Intra-regional Absten-

tions again reveal no interesting patterns along the lines
of colonial, religious, or governmental differences.
TABLE XIII
ECOWAS MEMBER NO VOTES
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 31st SESSION
Mauritania
Niger
Upper Volta

Resolution 31/53
Decision 31/1413
Decision 31/1413

Mauritania voted No on The Question of Timor.

This

can be explained as a reaction to the colonial independence
issue involved in the resolution.

Mauritania's involvement

in the Spanish Sahara dispute made its concern for this issue
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area different than other ECOWAS states.

Other African

states with similar situations in their past also voted No. 12
No votes on Decision 1413 were distributed throughout
a seemingly disparate group of third world states.
In comparison with the 31st Session, the 35th Session
marked an increase in the incident of Abstention and No votes.
There was a 36 percent reduction in unanimous votes
among the African states.

In 1976 only 41 percent of the

Resolutions passed by unanimous vote.

13

TABLE XIV
ECOWAS MEMBER NO VOTES
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 35th SESSION (1981)
Decision

Resolutions
Benin
Nigeria
Senegal
Upper Volta
This

144c

190
190

213
35/446

123
35/446

examination of the 31st and 35th Sessions of the

General Assembly canryot establish the existence of a discernable

votin~~p~ttern

related to ECOWAS states.

The fact

e rarely employed by the African states makes
elaborate analysis of their individual voting patterns
impossible.

They represent a homogeneous voting bloc in the

General Assembly.
Possibly the evidence suggests a degree of concern
among the ECOWAS members which stands above that of the EEC.
But the fact that this consensus is developed around a greater
pole, that of the third world voting pattern, makes it
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impossible to infer within this group as to how regions
have voted within it.
We can say that as a base measure for further analysis
that the ECOWAS states do not present a distinct voting bloc
as of the 35th Session of the General Assembly.
Within the subregion the ECOWAS states seem to
corroborate the findings of Rai.

14

His examination of global

voting patterns among third world states revealed no differentation between those states along lines of differing
religious belief.

For West Africa we can add that there are

also no differences along lines of colonial heritage.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to demonstrate the level of
integration among the ECOWAS member states.

This aim was to

be accomplished through the use of several quantifiable
indicators of integration.
The review of the literature considering integration
indicated that it has been the attitude of past writers on
the subject that integration efforts among third world
countries hold less than encouraging potential for success.
Because of the low levels of commercial and political
interaction among third world countries, even those states
who are regionally related, it has been suggested that the
dynamic rationale for integration is not as strong inthird
world circumstances as it was in the European context.

This

paper has demonstrated, however, the new logic for integration
ai:nong third world countries.

This logic suggests that in the

context of import substitution efforts for development there
is potential for success in third world integration models
if the effective markets for regional products are expanded
and the net result of the community is trade creation.

The

concentration on markets demonstrates the important economic
aspects of the regional integration schemes.
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FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
~he

goals of this work were to illustrate the level of

integration in ECOWAS; and the selection and application of
data sets that may prove useful to the analysis of third
world integration schemes.
results toward the

This paper has shown mixed

attaini~ent

of those goals.

The work has demonstrated that, with some qualifications,
the data sets presented of fer a more useful information base
than has been considered by other works analyzing third
world integration efforts.

The data sets are useful princip-

ally because of availability.

Treaties, trade data, and U.N.

General Assembly Voting Records provide some of the clearest
data sets that are readily available.

Because the data are

universal they allow ready analysis of intraregional relations
among nations as well as comparative measures of member
states' global relations.

Each of the data sets have been

employed previously in various studies of the integration
potential and performance of the EEC.

Thus, the rationale

for the use of the data sets has become established within
the literature.
The present work has added to that literature by
presenting a refined variation of the analysis of trade data.
By refining the analysis of third world state trade
data a better glimpse of international commercial relations
between third world states is developed.

In the case of the

ECONAS :::nember states it has been demonstrated that, when
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primary

produc~

commodity exports are eliminated, the

remaining exports: basic manufactures, transportation goods,
food, etc., can show localized trade patterns often obscured
by concentration on overall trade percentages which are
heavily influenced by primary product exports.
In the case of the ECOWAS states, application of this
refined approach demonstrated that the member states are
strongly related in their non-primary product export trade.
While this trade, overall, is but a minor source of revenue
to the member states, the analysis does demonstrate that the
non-primary trade the member states engage in is largely
within the region.

The states are developing a functional

relationship through trade that may be setting a pattern for
future, more important, regional relations.
The available data for treaty making was inconclusive
in establishing degrees of integration within ECOWAS.

The

data did seem to indicate that the relatively young independent African states had not developed a tradition of fornalizing
their relations by treaty to the degree found in developed
c6untries.

It may be that this feature is in part due to the

fact that t:he ECOWAS states have weak intraregional commercial
relations.

The findings from treaty data would tend to

suggest that ECOWAS states have a limited level of integration.
They certainly did not develop the intensified treaty
relations before the formation of the regional organization
as was demonstrated by the original six members of the EEC.
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Treaty data should, however, be useful for the study
of other regional integration efforts.

At least they should

be applied in other studies to determine if the pattern of
intensified relations demonstrated in Europe was unique.
Research of other regional integration efforts may also
allow a comparative study of the employment of treaty making
among various third world regions.
Quantitative analysis of the United Nations General
Assembly Voting Record to discern patterns of international
relations is also well established in political science
literature.

As with the other data sets, variations of

analysis have been turned to regional integration measures.
Again, work on the EEC established the theoretical rationale,
specialized techniques, and benchmark values, for relating
voting patterns of states to regional integration.
In the case of ECOWAS, voting pattern analysis could
not yield information on the state of integration in West
Africa.

Due to the prevalent use of the Abstention vote in

lieu of the No vote by the self declared non-aligned states
the discovery of voting patterns among nations has become
difficult.
"

The use of the Abstention vote may plague voting
studies of third world regional patterns for some time to
come.

If the non-aligned movement begins to evolve or break

up into more diverse component parts a new criteria by which
voting patterns can be considered may develop.

Until that
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time, however, there may be little to gain from quantitative
considerations of U.N. General Assembly voting patterns.
Individual voting relationships may continue to be of
interest but sophisticated statistical analysis is precluded.
Earlier quantitative analysis saw a change in the
alignment of African states which found many of the future
ECOWAS states within the same groups identified by factor
analysis.

After 1975, however, further change was difficult

to chart due to the shift to Abstention votes by the nonaligned states.
Some minor distinctions were revealed by this study but
the isolated nature of these differences makes them difficult
to analyze.

While it could be said that any No vote would

be unusual and therefore of interest there is no way to
discern voting patterns as indicators of the level of cornmunity integration with so few votes that deviate from the
standard pattern.
Votes within the cowmunity were no different from those
found in Africa as a whole.

Useful conclusions would be

difficult to draw from the results presented, save for the
negative conclusion that U.N. voting records may not be as
~

useful for analysis as they once were.
QUALITATIVE FEATURES OF ECOWAS INTEGRATION
Perhaps the most interesting features of the Ecm·lAS
scheme and the interrelations of its members are qualitative.
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The

me~ber

states have been demonstrated to be young

states, with poor economies and weak national traditions.
Cooperative patterns are still developing within the states,
and domestic relations remain more important than regional
ones.
While the organization has been established for over
eight years there have been few physical achievements posted
by ECOWAS.

This is in stark contrast to the experience of

the EEC, but not much different than the experience of other
third world integration efforts.

At least, in distinction

to the EAC, ECOWAS has remained intact and members are still
giving nominal support to the ECOWAS scheme.
Institutions such as the West Africa Clearing House and
the telecommunications project

aQ~inistration

are in place

and ready for an "administrative takeoff" but national
politicians have not made the urgent call for implementation
of increased duties by ECOWAS.

As it remains impossible to

measure the resolve of national elites, the will to implement
ECOWAS machinery remains unclear.

Some hints to this resolve

can be extracted from the experiences at the OAU meetings in
the summer of 1983 as well as the history of the expulsion of
\'

the foreign nationals from Nigeria in January 1983.

There

appears to be a desire to maintain the organization at some
level; that level, however, appears to be much lower than the
broad plans outlined by the founding treaty.
It may be that the ECOWAS scheme will continue to
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increase its responsibilities and powers.

The regional

organization remains, however, little more than an outline
of its potential and has accomplished less, functionally,
politically, and economically, in it's first eight years
than the six European states managed with just the establishment of the ECSC.
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APPENDIX

ECOWAS MEMBER STATES

9. Ivory Coast
3. Niger
4. Nigeria
5. Benin

··10. Liberia
11. Sierra Leone
12. Guinea
13. Guinea~Bissau
14. Gambia
15. Senegal

6. Togo
7. Ghana
8. Upper Volta 16. Cope Verde Islands

===,;;;;;;...500

or:

miles

500 1000 km
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Source: International Herald Tribune (Paris),
27 June 1983.
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